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Dynamic stabilityNeuroticism (N) scores predict psychopathology. Therefore, it is important to know how to best interpret
N-scores. This paper reviews prior interpretations, the item content of N-measures and relevant empirical
studies. We propose that N-scores reﬂect person-speciﬁc negative affect set points. We distinguish three
possible set point models. (1) The immutable set point model in which N-scores ﬂuctuate with short-term
perturbations in reaction to positive and negative experiences but always return to their person-speciﬁc
set point. (2) The experience-dependent model in which an individual's set point can change during any
life stage when prompted by far-reaching experiences. (3) The mixed model, a combination of the ﬁrst
two models, which separates the variation in neuroticism into stable and changing components. The
changing component is experience-dependent. Current evidence provides little support for the immutable
model. Rather, the evidence, though inconclusive, suggests that the experience-dependent or mixed model
may help to explain between- and within-subject differences in N-scores across the life span. In particular,
the observation that the differential consistency of N-scores tends to drop over time, but has not been
shown to approach zero, is consistent with the mixed model. We discuss implications of the models and
how to distinguish them empirically.
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rights reserved.1. Introduction
High neuroticism (N) scores are strongly associated with the
development, presence, and persistence of many forms of psychopa-
thology (see for reviews Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010;
Lahey, 2009; Ormel, Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004; Watson & Clark,
1984). N-scores also explain substantial covariance among current
and lifetime mental disorders, especially internalizing disorders.
This suggests that high N-scores are a core feature of internalizing
72 J. Ormel et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 32 (2012) 71–79psychopathology (Clark, 2005). N-scores are also associated with
subjective physical health. Various large studies of representative
samples even found that low N-scores predict longevity after
controlling for age, sex, education, smoking, alcohol consumption,
physical activity, and baseline health (see for review Lahey, 2009).
The economic burden of neuroticism to the society as a whole is
enormous and exceeds those of common mental disorders (Cuijpers
et al., 2010).
The signiﬁcance of the prospective associations between N-scores
and psychopathology is not straightforward. At least three factors
hamper a straight forward causal interpretation of the prospective
association. First, there is considerable overlap in item content
between measures of neuroticism and measures of common forms
of psychopathology. Second, accumulating evidence suggests
substantial overlap in the etiology of neuroticism and psychopatholo-
gy, in particular social anxiety and depression (Hettema, Neale,
Myers, Prescott, & Kendler, 2006; Ormel, Riese, Bos, et al., 2011).
Third, N-scores are elevated during an episode of mental disorder,
particularly for internalizing disorders (Akiskal, Hirschfeld, &
Yerevanian, 1983; Costa, Bagby, Herbst, & McCrae, 2005; Kendler,
Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1993; Ormel, Oldehinkel, &
Vollebergh, 2004). Although most evidence suggests that this
so-called state effect is temporary, the effect's implications are
unclear and strongly debated. Some claim it causes a major distortion
of personality assessment (Akiskal et al., 1983) while others believe it
to be a reliable and valid reﬂection of current personality (Costa et al.,
2005).
The primary objective of this paper is to identify the best way to
interpret N-scores. This may advance understanding of the associa-
tion between N-scores and psychopathology. We review previous
interpretations and critically examine the item content of
N-measures. We also consider research on differential change and
consistency of N-scores over time and the determinants of individual
differences in intraindividual change such as life events. Research that
targets individual differences in personality change is important
because it addresses both why individual personality trajectories
change and why mean-level changes in population occur (Roberts &
Mroczek, 2008). Recently, several studies using growth modeling
analytic techniques have shown substantial individual deviations
from the normative pattern of mean-level change in neuroticism
(see for overview Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, & Nagy, 2011;
Mroczek & Little, 2006).
Though still limited, the evidence suggests that neuroticism both
predicts life experiences (selection effect) and responds to them
(causation effect) (Lüdtke et al., 2011; Vaidya, Gray, Haig, & Watson,
2002) as N-scores seem to ﬂuctuate over time around a person-
characteristic set point of negative affect in response to life events.
It also suggests that this set point may change in reaction to
far-reaching experiences. Therefore, we will evaluate three variants
of this dynamic equilibrium model of N-scores. (1) The immutable
set point model in which N-scores ﬂuctuate with short-term pertur-
bations in reaction to positive and negative experiences but always
return to their person-speciﬁc set point. (2) The experience-
dependent model in which an individual's set point can change
during any life stage when prompted by far-reaching experiences.
(3) The mixed model, a combination of the ﬁrst two models, which
separates the variation in neuroticism into stable and changing
components, with the changing component being experience-
dependent. Finally, we describe how future research could evaluate
and distinguish between the models to determine the most plausible
interpretations of N-scores.
2. The concept of neuroticism versus neuroticism scores
Despite the central importance of neuroticism in personality
theory, there is no consensus on its deﬁnition (Buss & Plomin, 1984;Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1980; Digman, 1997; Eysenck & Eysenck,
1975; Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 2003; McCrae & Costa, 1997;
Tellegen & Waller, 1997; Widiger, 2009; Zuckerman, 1991;
Zuckerman, 2003). Eysenck and others deﬁne neuroticism as a
temperamental trait of emotionality: a tendency to arouse quickly
when stimulated and to inhibit slowly when aroused (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1985). Costa and McCrae (1992b) deﬁne neuroticism as a
major domain of personality that contrasts adjustment or emotional
stability with maladjustment or negative emotionality. Neuroticism
has also been deﬁned as: inability to control urges; inefﬁciently
coping with stress; preferring a particular threat management strate-
gy; a disposition to complain; and tending to have unrealistic ideas, to
appraise situations as stressful, and to experience aversive emotional
states (John, Robins, & Pervin, 2008; Mathews et al., 2003; Pervin &
John, 1999; Widiger, Hurt, Frances, Clarkin, & Gilmore, 1984). While
some of these deﬁnitions closely match the item content of neuroti-
cism questionnaires, others suggest possible underlying biological or
psychological mechanisms that may generate high N-scores.
Researches have created many labels to characterize high
N-scores. The term neuroticism has been favored by Eysenck, Costa
and McCrae, and others, while the terms emotionality, emotional
instability, and negative affectivity have been introduced by, respec-
tively (Goldberg, 1993; Lee & Ashton, 2004; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988). These labels are often used interchangeably in the lit-
erature because of evidence-based consensus that individuals scoring
high on N-measures exhibit emotional instability and negative
affectivity (Shankman & Klein, 2003). Although many consider these
alternative labels as similar to one another, their measures do reﬂect
signiﬁcant differences (Pervin & John, 1999). The differences are most
marked in the level of the facet scales included in the measures. For
instance, the neuroticism trait of the California Psychological Invento-
ry (CPI) Big Five (Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2008) distinguishes
four facets (Anxiety, Irritability, Depression, and Rumination–
Compulsiveness); the NEO Personality Inventory—Revised (NEO-
PI-R) (Costa & McCrae, 1992a) six facets (Anxiety, Angry Hostility,
Depression, Self-Consciousness, Vulnerability, and Impulsiveness);
the Eysenck Personality Proﬁler three facets (Anxiety, Inferiority,
Unhappiness); the Big Five Aspects Scale (DeYoung, Quilty, &
Peterson, 2007) two aspects (Withdrawal, Volatility); and the
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) (Tellegen &
Waller, 1997) three facets (Alienation, Stress Reaction, Aggres-
sion). While Anxiety–Withdrawal, Depression–Unhappiness,
Vulnerability–Stress Reaction are typically considered major facets
of neuroticism, there is less agreement whether Angry Hostility–
Aggression, Impulsivity, Inferiority, and Dependency belong to
the neuroticism domain (Widiger, 2009).
Both the broad trait of neuroticism and its lower-order facets rest
almost entirely on factor analyses of words used to describe behaviors
in daily life, the lexical approach (Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman,
2003; Pervin & John, 1999). Self-report questionnaires and verbal
reports are the most common methods of personality assessment
(John et al., 2008). Objective behavioral tests have not been validated
and are rarely used (Mathews et al., 2003; Pervin & John, 1999). The
item content of neuroticism questionnaires and measures of common
mental disorders are strikingly similar. Many N-items are similar to
the symptommeasures of anxiety disorders, mood disorders, impulse
control problems, psychological distress, and the negative affect and
cognitions that often accompany other mental disorders. Table 1
lists a large number of items from the 48-item N-domain of the
NEO-PI-R and similar items from two popular symptom measures,
the 90-item Symptom Checklist (SCL) and the 60-item General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ). However, there are two major differences
between N-items and symptom measures: N-items lack a speciﬁc
time frame and severity descriptors. Instead, neuroticism inventories
use non-speciﬁc descriptors of frequency, intensity, and duration.
This non-speciﬁcity of items facilitates the disclosure of negative
Table 1
Item overlap between the neuroticism domain of the NEO-PI-R and two popular symptom measures, the 90-item Symptom Checklist (SCL) and the 60-item General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ).
Neuroticism facets NEO-PI-Ra SCL 90 (past 2 weeks) GHQ (past 30 days)
N1 anxiety
1 I am not a worrier. Worrying too much about things. Worrying unduly?
31 I am easily frightened. Suddenly scared for no reason. Scared and panicky …no good reason?
61 I rarely feel fearful or anxious. Feeling fearful.
91 I often feel tense and jittery. Nervousness or shakiness inside. Easily upset over things?
Feeling nervous and strung up?
151 I often worry about things that might go wrong. Afraid something awful is going to
happen?
181 I have fewer fears than most people.
211 Frightening thoughts sometimes come into my head. The idea that something is wrong with your mind. Unwelcome thoughts keep coming in?
N2 irritability
36 I'm an even-tempered person. Temper outbursts that you could not control. Edgy and bad tempered?
66 I am known as hot-blooded and quick-tempered. Shouting or throwing things. Losing temper?
96 I am not considered a touchy or temperamental person. Others regard you as touchy?
156 I takes a lot to get me mad. Getting into frequent arguments. Little annoyances, upset and angry?
216 Even minor annoyances can be frustrating to me. Feeling easily annoyed or irritated.
N3 depression
11 I rarely feel lonely or blue. Feeling blue.
41 Sometimes I feel completely worthless. Feeling or worthlessness. Felt that life isn't worth living?
71 I am seldom sad or depressed. Feeling unhappy and depressed.
101 I have sometimes experienced a deep sense of guilt or sinfulness. The idea that you should be punished for your sins.
Feelings of guilt.
131 I tend to blame myself when anything goes wrong. Blaming yourself for things. Blaming yourself things going wrong?
161 I have a low opinion of myself. Feelings inferior to others.
221 Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up. Worried about sloppiness or carelessness.
N4 consciousness
46 I seldom feel self-conscious when I'm around people. Feeling very self-conscious with others.
76 At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide. Feeling that you're a burden?
136 I often feel inferior to others. Feeling inferior to others. Thinking of yourself as worthless?
196 If I have said or done the wrong thing to someone, I can hardly bear to
face them again.
Worried about sloppiness or carelessness. Afraid….. express foolish mistakes?
N5 impulsiveness
171 I sometimes eat myself sick. Overeating.
201 Sometimes I do things on impulse that I later regret. Having urges to beat, injure or harm someone.
Having urges to break or smash things.
231 I am always able to keep my feelings under control. Temper outbursts that you could not control.
N6 vulnerability
26 I often feel helpless and want someone else to solve my problems. Couldn't overcome difﬁculties?
56 I feel I am capable of coping with most of my problems. Able to face your problems?
116 I keep a cool head in emergencies. Your mind going blank.
146 It's often hard for me to make up my mind. Difﬁculty making decisions.
206 When everything seems to be going wrong, I can still make good decisions. Capable of making decisions?
236 I'm pretty stable emotionally. Your feelings being easily hurt. Feeling easily hurt?
Note. NEO-PI-R NEO=Personality Inventory-Revised (Costa & McCrae, 1992a); SCL-90=Symptom Check List (Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973); GHQ=General Health
Questionnaire (Goldberg & Williams, 1988).
a Number refers to the NEO-PI-R item number.
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measure a variety of negative emotions and cognitions that feature
heavily in the measures and diagnostic criteria of many mental
disorders, in particular internalizing disorders but also externalizing
disorders although to a lesser extent. In addition, neuroticism
questionnaires measure the propensity to express these emotions.
The difﬁculties in deﬁning the construct of neuroticism are largely
due to a lack of consistent evidence on the neurobiological bases and
determinants of N-scores. In particular, psychophysiological research
regarding central non-speciﬁc activation, autonomic peripheral
activation, and hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal axis activation
(cortisol) has yielded inconsistent results (Claridge & Davis, 2001;
Ormel, Riese, Bastiaansen, et al., 2011; Zuckerman, 2003). Recent
neurobiological (Depue, 2009), neurogenetic (Canli, 2008) and
evolutionary-psychological approaches (Matthews, 2004) have
produced promising ﬁndings, but these approaches are still in their
infancy and their ﬁndings need replication and further elaboration.
Hence, it seems wise to base the interpretation of N-scores on thedeﬁnable characteristics of N-measures, in particular item content,
stability and change of N-scores across the adult life course, and the
determinants of change in N-scores. The latter two topics are
reviewed in the next two sections.3. Differential consistency and change in N-scores
The literature typically distinguishes two types of consistency (or
stability): group mean level consistency (absolute stability) versus
rank-order (differential) consistency. In other words, the stability of
the group as a whole versus the retention of an individual's relative
placement within that group. Differential change is fueling individual
differences in intra-individual change (Mroczek & Spiro, 2003). The
largest changes in personality after childhood occur in late adoles-
cence and early adulthood (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006).
In that period the population mean of neuroticism drops substantial-
ly. After age 30, the groupmean level of neuroticism in the population
74 J. Ormel et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 32 (2012) 71–79tends to remain stable. This suggests that age-related shifts in
neuroticism are limited during adulthood (Roberts et al., 2006).
Meta-analytic estimates of mean population test-retest correla-
tion coefﬁcients show clearly that differential consistency increases
with age, from around .30 during infancy to .45 during adolescence
and .60 during young and middle adulthood (until age 50) (Roberts
& DelVecchio, 2000). Differential consistency over protracted
intervals is substantial, especially after age 30—but importantly also
steadily drops over longer time intervals across the entire life-span.
The negative correlation between time interval and differential
consistency is modest but highly signiﬁcant (−.36). Starting at age
20, Roberts and DelVecchio estimated the average trait consistency
over a 1-year period at .55; over 5 years .52; over 10 years .49; over
20 years .41, and over 40 years .25. These estimates were largely
based on studies that assessed neuroticism twice. Although attrition,
which was typically substantial, did not distort the differential
consistency estimates, many studies used samples drawn from privi-
leged and educated populations. This may have biased consistency
estimates upward (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000).
Two recent studies assessed neuroticism at least four times during
a period of about two decades, reporting somewhat lower rank-order
stabilities (Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000; Wray, Birley, Sullivan, Visscher, &
Martin, 2007). Wray and colleagues found test–retest correlations of
around 0.60 for intervals of about 10 years and from 0.57 to 0.45 for
intervals ranging from 13 to 22 years. These are similar to the test–
retest correlations of about 0.58 for 8- to 10-year intervals and 0.51
to 0.45 for 14- to 16-year intervals reported by Ormel and Rijsdijk.
Collectively, the longitudinal studies suggest substantial continuity
of neuroticism during adulthood, with a gradual decline in consisten-
cy reaching an asymptote of about 0.40. This pattern of longitudinal
correlations suggests the workings of two dynamic processes: a trait
process producing differential consistency and an autoregressive
process producing differential change.
To explain the pattern of longitudinal correlations, Ormel and
Rijsdijk (2000) compared three longitudinal models using 5-waveT
S1 S2 S3 
N1 N2 N3




 z2  z3
b2 b3
Fig. 1. Mixed model for 5-wave assessment of neuroticism. Note: T=latent trait factor;
regression coefﬁcient (factor loading indicating the stable variance in the observed N-sc
N-scores). e=measurement error variance; zi=inﬂuence of unobserved determinants
will typically be equal as well). If the bottom part of the model (Si)) is removed, the tr
model emerges.
Adapted from Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000).neuroticism data covering 16 years of adult life from a random popu-
lation sample of 296 adults. (1) The trait (or common factor) model
asserts that neuroticism is correlated over time only because of
underlying traits which are immutable in adulthood. The trait
model predicts that test–retest correlations are independent of the
length of interval (assuming stable trait expression over time).
(2) The autoregressive (or simplex) model posits ongoing cumulative
differential change. That is, neuroticism changes, on average, slowly
but continuously. The auto-regression model predicts that test–retest
correlations decrease gradually over increasing time, ultimately
declining towards a correlation of zero. Both of these models express
extreme positions. (3) Fig. 1 presents the mixed model for a 5-wave
assessment of neuroticism. This mixed model disentangles the
variation in neuroticism into one immutable or trait component
(T, in Fig. 1) and a second component (Si) that changes over time
according to a ﬁrst order auto-regressive process. This autoregressive
process includes inertia-driven carry-over effects and effects from
environmental exposures that lead to experiences that change the
individual's N-score for shorter or longer periods of time. The mixed
model predicts that correlations will decrease with time, but the
constant inﬂuence of the immutable component will ensure that
they never approach zero.
Though it provides little support for the trait model, the data was
found to ﬁt both the auto-regression and mixed models (Ormel &
Rijsdijk, 2000). The auto-regression model estimated the 16-year
auto-regression at .60 (95%CI .50–.69), which gives an annual
auto-regression of .967. This estimate is similar to the annual auto-
regression of 0.98 reported earlier (Conley, 1984). Thus, the auto-
regression model suggests a slow but sustained rate of change in
N-scores. In the mixed model, the trait component accounted for
38% of the variance in neuroticism (95% CI 0%–55%). Note that the
CI includes zero variance. Extrapolation to 30 years yields a 30-year
differential consistency of .37 according to the auto-regression
model and of .45 according to the mixed model. The strong







 z4  z5 
b4 b5 
Ni=observed neuroticism scores at 5 waves; Si=latent changing component; ti=
ores); ai=regression coefﬁcient (indicating the changing variance in the observed
of change in N-scores; bi=auto-regression coefﬁcient (if intervals are equal, these
ait model emerges. If the top part of the model (T) is removed, the autoregressive
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estimate of the mixed model (95% CI 0%–55%). This suggests the
need for a large sample size in order to accurately disentangle the
contributions of trait effect versus auto-regression (carry-over
effects) to differential consistency.
The existence of both differential consistency and change is
consistent with results from studies of twins. Twin studies generally
report heritability variance estimates for neuroticism in the 40% to
50% range (Eaves et al., 1999; Flint, 2004; Heath, Neale, Kessler,
Eaves, & Kendler, 1992; Jardine, Martin, & Henderson, 1984; Loehlin,
1992; Tambs, Sundet, Eaves, Solaas, & Berg, 1991; Viken, Rose,
Kaprio, & Koskenvuo, 1994). Furthermore, the correlations over
time of nonmeasured genetic inﬂuences are very high, suggesting
that neuroticism's genetic determinants remain largely unchanged
over time. Conversely, the correlations over time of nonmeasured
environmental determinants (latent environmental variables) are
much smaller suggesting that they are more time-speciﬁc and subject
to change (McGue, Bacon, & Lykken, 1993; Wray et al., 2007). For
instance, in the Australian–Dutch collaborative study (Wray et al.,
2007), the correlations between nonmeasured genetic inﬂuences
over periods of up to 22 years were all extremely high (mean 0.90)
and hardly decreased over time. In contrast, the correlations between
nonmeasured environmental inﬂuences over 22 years dropped from
0.53 to 0.24, suggesting that environmental inﬂuences are more
time-speciﬁc and are replaced by other environmental events. Both
these ﬁndings are consistent with the mixed model.
4. Determinants of change in N-scores
Which experiences during adulthood cause sustained change in
N-scores and explain differential change? It is unlikely that aging
itself is involved, since mean levels of neuroticism in the population
remain relatively stable after age 30. The substantial decrease in
mean level during late adolescence and early adulthood and the
much smaller decrease during later adulthood is typically attributed
to intrinsic maturational processes (McCrae et al., 2000; Roberts &
Mroczek, 2008) including the effects of age-graded social roles
(Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008). The low rate of differential change
in N-scores during adulthood suggests that experiences that bring
about sustained change are infrequent.
Exposure to persistent uncontrollable stress, in particular during
adolescence and young adulthood, seems to contribute to an indivi-
dual's N-scores later in life (Roberts, Wood, & Smith, 2005; Rutter,
2006; van Os & Jones, 1999). In contrast, controllable stress paired
with adequate social support tends to reduce N-scores (Andrews,
Page, & Neilson, 1993; Rutter, 2006). Another category of change
agents include success and failure in the major social roles of
marriage and work that seem dynamically related to personality
(Caspi & Roberts, 1999; Robins, Fraley, Roberts, & Trzesniewski,
2001; Vaidya et al., 2002). High N-scores predict feelings of relation-
ship insecurity, while the formation of a romantic relationship leads
to a decrease in N-scores (Lucas, Clark, Georgelis, & Diener, 2004;
Neyer & Asendorpf, 2001). Marriage, remarriage, increasing marital
satisfaction, and satisfying and engaging employment are associated
with decreases in N-scores and associated measures (Roberts &
Chapman, 2000; Scollon & Diener, 2006). In contrast, conﬂict, poor
relationship quality, divorce (for men) and chronic or repeated
unemployment lead to increases in N-scores (Costa, Herbst, McCrae,
& Siegler, 2000; Lucas et al., 2004; Lüdtke, Trautwein, & Husemann,
2009; Robins, Caspi, & Mofﬁtt, 2000; Scollon & Diener, 2006). This
evidence supports the neosocioanalytic model of personality devel-
opment (Roberts et al., 2008). This model posits that adult personality
development is driven by the experiences that go along with age-
graded social roles. The expectations and contingencies associated
with age-graded roles in work, family, community, and society
bring along rewards and punishments that prompt people to becomeless neurotic (and more conscientious and agreeable) (Roberts et al.,
2008).
The evidence on the dynamic relationship between social role
experiences and personality also supports a transactional model
with its selection and causation effects. Selection refers to the
inﬂuence of pre-event personality on people's experiences. Most
experiences do not occur randomly. Rather, they are brought about
by the individual, at least to some extent, because people's personal-
ities select them into particular situations or because their personally-
related behaviors evoke certain reactions from others (Headey &
Wearing, 1989; Ormel & Wohlfarth, 1991; Scarr & McCartney,
1983). Causation effects refer to the causal inﬂuence of experiences
on personality and are also called socialization effects in the develop-
mental literature (Vaidya et al., 2002).
Another important theoretical explanation for both mean-level
change and individual differences in intra-individual change in N is
life-span developmental theory which stresses the role of nonnorma-
tive life events (Baltes & Brim, 1979). Such nonnormative experiences
are infrequent and outside the range of typical social role experiences
and hypothesized to have the potential to alter the trajectory of per-
sonality development (Costa et al., 2000; Löckenhoff, Terracciano,
Patriciu, Eaton, & Costa, 2009; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Middeldorp, Cath,
Beem, Willemsen, & Boomsma, 2008; Mroczek & Spiro, 2003). In
particular, experiences that affect central aspects of one's identity
such as loss of a job, divorce, personal illness or injury, and other
major changes in work, marital, and health status, have been found
to predict neuroticism change. Here too, the still limited evidence
suggests transactional effects in that neuroticism predicts (selection
effect) and responds to (causation effect) life experiences as well.
For instance, Ludtke and colleagues found that baseline N-scores
predict negative life events (but not positive life events) whereas
change in neuroticism is linked to the experience of negative and
positive life events as well, with negative events being linked to an
increase in N-scores and positive events with a decrease in
N-scores. Finally, there is some evidence that effective treatment of
depression with SSRI's (Tang et al., 2009) and CBT (Jorm, 1989) can
reduce N-scores in excess and independent of the effect on
depression.
It is worth of note that nonexperimental real-world research can
never demonstrate that truly causal processes are driving the
selection and causation associations; these associations could be due
to the effect of unobserved third variables, including genetic
confounding. Genetic confounding refers to the possibility that
genetic characteristics have causal effects on the environmental
exposure as well as on the development of neuroticism, thereby
producing non-causal statistical association among these variables.
The monozygotic (MZ) co-twin control design is a strong design to
reduce the potential for genetic confounding and increase causal
plausibility. The few studies using MZ twins have found that
neuroticism scores increase after exposure to negative life events,
particularly when the twin experience personal illness or injury
(Middeldorp et al., 2008) .
5. Interpretation of N-scores
How should we interpret N-scores? As described earlier, the
content of N-items overlaps with the symptoms of common mental
disorders, in particular those of internalizing psychopathology. In
addition, N-items use vague descriptors of frequency, intensity, and
duration. They do not deﬁne the time frames about which they ask,
increasing the likelihood that respondents disclose complaints about
how they feel and function. These distinctive features suggest an
interpretation of N-scores as a person's self-perceived level of
negative affect over a prolonged period. Psychosocial events, and
measurement error, may temporarily alter the estimate of negative
affect. However, decay of the effect of events and homeostatic
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negative affect levels back to a person-speciﬁc set point.
The set point theory of subjective well-being is relevant here. Its
central tenet is that adult individuals have differing but stable levels
of subjective well- and ill-being (Brickman & Campbell, 1971;
Headey & Wearing, 1991; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Ormel &
Schaufeli, 1991). In accordance with the set point theory, an indivi-
dual's N-score is in a dynamic equilibrium, ﬂuctuating over time
around a person-characteristic set point in reaction to positive and
negative experiences. The dynamic equilibrium model is compatible
with evidence showing substantially higher N-scores during episodes
of exposure to stressful life events and mental illness in comparison
to pre- and post-episode periods (Akiskal et al., 1983; Costa et al.,
2005; Kendler et al., 1993; Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Vollebergh, 2004;
Ormel, Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004).
We distinguish two fundamental conceptualizations of set points.
The immutable set point posits that individual set points of neuroti-
cism do not change. Many personality psychologists espouse this
view regarding personality traits as internally driven and indepen-
dent of environmental inﬂuences. This dynamic-equilibrium model
of an immutable person-characteristic set point of neuroticism is
compatible with the trait model discussed above. It implies that
homeostatic forces keep an individual's set point constant over
time, bringing it back to its original level after particular experiences
have pushed it away. However, though the notion of an immutable
set point ﬁts the evidence of neuroticism's high differential consisten-
cy, but it is inconsistent with the robust evidence showing a slow but
steady decline in differential consistency over time.
In contrast, the experience-dependent set point assumes that set
points can change, throughout life, when prompted by far-reaching
experiences that become biologically, cognitively, or environmentally
embedded. Biological embedding holds that environmental signals
cause sustained changes in regulatory neurophysiological systems
(Weaver et al., 2004; Zhang & Meaney, 2010). Recently many studies
have focused on the molecular mechanisms mediating the sustained
changes including epigenetic processes such as DNA methylation
and chromatin remodelling. Such changes often occur early in life
and can be quite permanent. From a biological point of view, the
experience-dependent model presupposes lifelong environmentally
driven neural plasticity, based on epigenetic processes (Zhang &
Meaney, 2010). Cognitive embedding occurs when far-reaching
experiences lead to persistent alterations in beliefs about the self
and others and the appraisal of and coping with stressful events.
Environmental embedding occurs when far-reaching experiences
cause sustained changes in the social environment that in turn
cause long-term changes in exposure to determinants of negative af-
fect. Examples of such experiences are a good or a bad marriage,
entering a good career or becoming chronically unemployed, or
lasting major health changes.
The mixed set point model combines these two basic concepts. In
the mixed set point model, N-scores partly reﬂect an immutable set
point and partly a changing experience-dependent set point that
undergoes shifts beyond those of measurement error and temporary
variation. The mixed set point model assumes that consistency
correlations will fall with time yet never reach zero because of the
persistent inﬂuence of immutable characteristics.
6. How to distinguish the models
The experience-dependent and mixed set point models are
difﬁcult to distinguish empirically, especially when the rate of change
in N-scores is very low. Because N-changing life events are rare and
typically have only small effects, differential change will be very
slow. This would be true even assuming an entirely experience-
dependent model with no immutable factor. Thus, when N-scores
change slowly, most N-score variance will appear immutable.Notwithstanding these difﬁculties, the models have three differing
empirical implications. First, the mixed set point model predicts
that the drop in differential consistency will level off with increased
time. In contrast, the experience-dependent model predicts an
ongoing drop even after intervals of 10–20 years. Second, the
strength of the association between major life events and N-scores
at successive follow-ups will drop faster in the mixed model than in
the experience-dependent model. This is because the mixed model
assumes that part of the N-score variance is ‘untouched’ by life
events. Third, if the experience-dependent model is correct, statistical
auto-regression of longitudinal N-scores during adulthood should ﬁt
better than a mixed model with a large immutable variance
component.
It is not easy to test these predictions, though the statistical tools
for the analysis of change and its determinants have become available
(Little, Bovaird, & Slegers, 2006; Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000; Roberts et al.,
2008). To compare the models, longitudinal data sets are required
with at least three assessments of neuroticism using the same
instrument over protracted periods of time in relatively large
population-based samples (Bollen & Curran, 2006; Kenny & Zautra,
1995; Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000). The total length of the study should
be preferably 10 years or longer, in particular when the participants
are 30 years or older at the start of the study. Ideal studies would
cover adolescence, young adulthood and midlife. It is best if
between-wave intervals are longer than a year given the very small
drop in differential consistency per year. Studies with more than
three waves are highly desirable as 3-wave models require rather
strong assumptions to identify the mixed model (Ormel & Rijsdijk,
2000). Models with more waves allow testing such assumptions.
Variation in interval length is not a problem as long as the longer
intervals can be expressed as a function of the shortest interval.
Sample size is important for statistical power and preferably be over
1000 (Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000). It is best if the sample is population-
based with a narrow age range as this helps ensure that the sample
is in steady state, so that mean and variance of N-scores will not
change over time from factors other than those to which the entire
cohort is exposed such as aging, birth cohort, and period effects.
Samples of individuals that are recruited at ‘non-random time points
in their life’ such as when in treatment or experiencing a major event
are problematic because their baselines N-scores are ‘biased’.
Not many studies meet these requirements. Table 2 describes a
number of long-term longitudinal studies of neuroticism that
involved at least three assessment waves. The overview is not
meant to be exhaustive but exemplary to illustrate what has been
done and the strengths and weaknesses of the databases for studying
the models. Studies that target N-scores as dependent variables are
uncommon and recent but are relatively easy to ﬁnd because they
mention that neuroticismwas assessed at multiple waves. In contrast,
studies which used neuroticism only as an independent variable –
although assessed multiple times – are difﬁcult to track down
because such studies rarely indicate that neuroticism was assessed
at multiple occasions. These studies often do not mention the
multiple assessment of neuroticism at all or “hide” it in the Methods
section. For each study in Table 2 we indicate the characteristics and
strengths and weaknesses for testing the models. Attrition is a
widespread problem and unfortunately, is rarely random. In
general, the longer a study is, with more waves, the smaller the
sample size and the larger the attrition. Nonetheless some studies,
in particular when pooled, may be usable to test the models.
7. Concluding comments: Towards a better interpretation
of neuroticism
Neuroticism has long been considered to be the high-order per-
sonality trait most relevant to psychopathology. However, historical-
ly, the supporting research has been based solely on factor analyses of
Table 2
Characteristics of Long-term longitudinal studies of neuroticism with at least three assessment waves in adulthood.









Lüdtke et al. (2009) 3 4 2 4544 60% 19; 1 N Waves; attrition; length
Scollon and Diener (2006) 5 9 2 1130 35%c 37; 13 N; >3 waves Age range; administratione
Neyer and Asendorpf (2001) 3 8 4 637 47% 24; 4 Waves; attrition
Steunenberg, Twisk, Beekman, Deeg, and Kerkhof (2005) 3 6 3 2117 42% 55–85 N Waves; attrition; age range
Roberts and Chapman (2000) 4 30 6–16 142 27% 21, 1 >3 waves; length N
Mroczek and Spiro (2003) 5 12 1–3 1663 26%c 43–91 N; >3 waves; length Age range; initially healthyf
Jones, Livson, and Peskin (2003) 4 42 13 279 22–69% 33–35 Length N; attrition
Kendler, Gardner, and Prescott (2002) 3 7 1–4 2354 ~26% 36; 8 N; attrition Waves; administratione
Ormel, Oldehinkel, and Vollebergh (2004) 3 3 1–2 7067 32% 18–64 N; attrition Waves; length; age range
Ormel and Rijsdijk (2000) 5 16 1–8 383 23% 34; 12 >3 waves; length N; age range
Wray et al. (2007) 4 22 3–10 4040 >20%c 33; ?? >3 waves; length Many were not followed up c.
Middeldorp et al. (2006) 3 6 2–4 7969 > 58% 18; 2 N Attrition; waves
Terracciano, McCrae, Brant, and Costa (2005) 5 9 M=2.8 1944 65% 57;17 >3 waves Attrition; age range
Note. To be included a study had to meet the following criteria: population-based, 3+ waves, total length 3+ years. The overview is not meant to be exhaustive. Its purpose is to
illustrate what has been done and the strengths and weaknesses of the studies for the analysis of trait-state models.
a Number of times neuroticism was measured.
b Time span in years between ﬁrst and last measurements of neuroticism; Interval length in years as well.
c Attrition was deﬁned contingent on the number of waves. For 3- and 4-wave studies, attrition refers to the percentage of participants who missed at least 1 administration; for
studies with 5 or more waves, attrition refers to the percentage of participants who missed at least 2 administrations. Total attrition in 5+ wave studies is typically much higher. In
the Scollon and Diener (2006), Mroczek and Spiro (2003), and Ormel and Rijsdijk (2000) studies, respectively, only 33%, 26%, and 58% provided all 5 measurements. In the Wray
study, exact attrition rates cannot be computed because many were not eligible for follow-up(s). Less than 1000 individuals were assessed at three or more occasions. In the
Terracciano et al., 2005 study the frequency of assessments ranged from 1 to 11. Attrition refers to the 1260 who participated twice or less; 684 participated at 3 or more occasions.
d As strengths we consider 4+ waves, a total length of 10+ years, a sample size of 1000+, attrition b35%, and a limited age range. As weaknesses, we consider 3 waves, a total
length of b5 years, a sample size of b500, attrition >40%, and a large age range.
e Administration refers to a change in how the neuroticism measure was administrated during the study, typically from paper and pencil to (phone) interview or vice versa.
f Subjects with physical or mental health problems were excluded.
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has resulted in uncertainty about the interpretation of N-scores.
This uncertainty is increased by the lack of consensus on the optimal
conceptualization and facet structure of neuroticism, its largely un-
known underlying biological mechanisms, and the strong overlap be-
tween measures of neuroticism and symptoms of common mental
disorders. Even so, because N-scores remain popular in psychopatho-
logical research, it is crucial to determine what N-scores mean.
The mixed model described in this paper posits that N-scores
reﬂect a person's level of negative affect during a particular period.
That level of negative affect ﬂuctuates over time around a person-
speciﬁc set point in response to positive and negative experiences.
Thus, an individual's negative affect set point predicts risk of psycho-
pathology. This should hold true whether the negative affect set point
is immutable over the life span, or whether it changes in response to
life experiences. The uncertainty on the interpretation of N-scores
does not imply that N-scores are without value. Rather, the measure
of person-speciﬁc negative set points provides a powerful and easy-
to-measure marker of risk for mental disorder (Ormel, Rosmalen, &
Farmer, 2004; Watson & Walker, 1996). However, for N-scores and
the risk they index to become etiologically and pathogenetically in-
formative, their neurobiological basis and speciﬁc genetic and envi-
ronmental determinants need to be established.
The immutable, experience-dependent and mixed set point
models provide a promising framework for future research to better
understand N-scores. Current evidence, though inconclusive,
provides little support for a fully immutable model. Rather, it suggests
that an experience dependent or mixed model may help to explain
the course of N-scores across the life span, including individual
differences in intraindividual change (Mroczek & Spiro, 2003). In
particular, the observation that the differential consistency of
N-scores drops over time, but has not been shown to approach zero,
is most consistent with the mixed model. The immutable component
may reﬂect the possibility that people with low N-scores are not
susceptible to sustained changes in negative affect whereas people
with relatively high N-scores are more likely to experience-
dependent changes. There is some evidence that if people with highN-scores are exposed to either particularly favorable or adverse life
events, their set-points of positive and negative affect may change
(Belsky & Pluess, 2009; Boyce & Ellis, 2005; Huppert, Baylis, &
Keverne, 2005). By beginning to understand how genetic and
environmental factors affect neuroticism, N-scores may transcend
their current utility as a risk-index of mental disorder to become an
effective tool in the treatment of psychopathology.
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